Microsoft Security Operations Analyst (SC-200) — Free Practice Questions
10 free sample questions from a bank of 467, with the correct answers and explanations. No signup required — start practising right now.
1You need to receive a security alert when a user attempts to sign in from a location that was never used by the other users in your organization to sign in.
Which anomaly detection policy should you use?
Impossible travel
Activity from anonymous IP addresses
Activity from infrequent country
Malware detection
Answer: C
The short version
C — Infrequent country detects the never-used location. Defender anomaly policies include Activity from infrequent country, which profiles normal sign-in countries and alerts on rarely or never seen origins. That matches a sign-in from a location never used by others. Impossible travel needs paired distant logons, anonymous IP targets anonymizers, and malware targets hosts.
Key concepts in this question
Infrequent country: Learns tenant baseline over weeks, scoring new countries by rarity across users.
Travel contrast: Needs two distant sign-ins by one user in a short window, not merely a novel country.
Anonymous contrast: Fires on Tor or proxy infrastructure regardless of novelty.
Purpose: Catches foreign attacker logons standing out against tenant history.
Why C is correct
The trigger emphasizes never used by others, an organizational rarity signal rather than single-user velocity. Infrequent country evaluates tenant history and raises on anomalous country, while travel would need a second timestamp and could miss a lone novel logon. The settled selection aligns logic with the trigger.
Why the others are wrong
A. travel needs paired distant logons in a short interval, undescribed here.
B. anonymous IP misses novel-country logons from plain addresses and over-alerts on anonymizers.
D. malware flags hosts, not geographic novelty of authentication.
SC-200 exam tip
Never-used country equals infrequent country, fast pair equals impossible travel.
2Note: This question is part of a series of questions that present the same scenario. Each question in the series contains a unique solution that might meet the stated goals. Some question sets might have more than one correct solution, while others might not have a correct solution.
After you answer a question in this section, you will NOT be able to return to it. As a result, these questions will not appear in the review screen.
You are configuring Microsoft Defender for Identity integration with Active Directory.
From the Microsoft Defender for identity portal, you need to configure several accounts for attackers to exploit.
Solution: From Entity tags, you add the accounts as Honeytoken accounts.
Does this meet the goal?
Yes
No
Answer: A
The short version
A — Yes, the Defender for Identity honeytoken step meets the goal. Honeytoken accounts act as traps that alert on any use. The settled key is A because configuring them satisfies the identity-threat detection aim.
Key concepts in this question
Defender for Identity: sensor-based protection that profiles users and flags lateral movement.
Honeytoken accounts: dormant decoys with no legitimate use, so any auth signals attacker activity.
Entity tags: console labels that mark accounts or devices as sensitive or honeytoken.
Yes-No series: each question tests one unique solution without return, so only fit matters.
Management path: Identities plus Entity tags plus Honey Token for adding decoys.
Why A is correct
A is correct because Microsoft docs direct admins to create honeytoken entities for exactly this trap scenario. Tagging a dormant account as honeytoken causes Defender for Identity to raise an alert on any authentication attempt. That behavior fulfills the stated goal in this branch of the series, so Yes is the explained outcome.
Why the others are wrong
B. No would deny a documented honeytoken alert path that directly meets the goal here.
SC-200 exam tip
When the solution adds honeytoken decoys for trap alerts, answer Yes; sensitivity tags serve a different need.
3Note: This question is part of a series of questions that present the same scenario. Each question in the series contains a unique solution that might meet the stated goals. Some question sets might have more than one correct solution, while others might not have a correct solution.
After you answer a question in this section, you will NOT be able to return to it. As a result, these questions will not appear in the review screen.
You are configuring Microsoft Defender for Identity integration with Active Directory.
From the Microsoft Defender for identity portal, you need to configure several accounts for attackers to exploit.
Solution: From Azure AD Identity Protection, you configure the sign-in risk policy.
Does this meet the goal?
Yes
No
Answer: B
The short version
B — No, this Defender for Identity proposal does not meet the goal. The series varies one solution per question, and this branch misses the required trap behavior. The settled key is B because the described steps cannot produce the needed alert.
Key concepts in this question
Defender for Identity integration: sensor plus cloud analytics for identity threats.
Honeytoken entities: traps that must be dormant accounts or devices to fire on use.
Sensitivity tags: labels for VIP active users, opposite of dormant decoys.
Unique-solution format: each item stands alone; prior Yes branches do not carry over.
No outcome: correct when the proposal lacks the dormant-trap mechanism.
Why B is correct
B is correct because the proposed configuration in this branch does not create a valid honeytoken trap that alerts on attacker use. Docs require adding users or devices under Identities plus Entity tags plus Honey Token with dormant status. Without that decoy setup, authentication will not trigger the expected alert, so the solution fails the goal and No is explained.
Why the others are wrong
A. Yes would claim the goal is met, but the missing honeytoken trap means no alert fires.
SC-200 exam tip
Check for dormant honeytoken creation; active-user sensitivity tags do not trap attackers.
4Note: This question is part of a series of questions that present the same scenario. Each question in the series contains a unique solution that might meet the stated goals. Some question sets might have more than one correct solution, while others might not have a correct solution.
After you answer a question in this section, you will NOT be able to return to it. As a result, these questions will not appear in the review screen.
You are configuring Microsoft Defender for Identity integration with Active Directory.
From the Microsoft Defender for identity portal, you need to configure several accounts for attackers to exploit.
Solution: You add the accounts to an Active Directory group and add the group as a Sensitive group.
Does this meet the goal?
Yes
No
Answer: B
The short version
B — No, sensitivity tags cannot substitute for honeytoken traps. Dormant decoys alert on any access while sensitivity marks active VIPs. The settled key is B because the proposal confuses those roles.
Key concepts in this question
Honeytoken accounts: dormant traps meant to generate alerts if touched.
Sensitivity tags: priority labels for active users and groups needing extra scrutiny.
Defender for Identity: consumes tags to tune detection, but only honeytoken guarantees trap firing.
Series logic: unique solution per question must be judged on its own mechanics.
Why B is correct
B is correct because sensitivity tags are designed for real executives and admins, not for decoys. Tagging an active account as sensitive will not create a dormant trap that fires on any logon. Since the goal requires a honeytoken-style tripwire, the sensitivity-only proposal fails and No is the explained verdict.
Why the others are wrong
A. Yes would treat sensitivity as a trap, but active accounts cannot serve as dormant decoys.
SC-200 exam tip
Memorize honeytoken equals dormant trap and sensitivity equals active VIP; they are not interchangeable.
5You implement Safe Attachments policies in Microsoft Defender for Office 365.
Users report that email messages containing attachments take longer than expected to be received.
You need to reduce the amount of time it takes to deliver messages that contain attachments without compromising security. The attachments must be scanned for malware, and any messages that contain malware must be blocked.
What should you configure in the Safe Attachments policies?
Dynamic Delivery
Replace
Block and Enable redirect
Monitor and Enable redirect
Answer: A
The short version
A — Dynamic Delivery speeds mail while Safe Attachments still scans. Users get the message at once with placeholders until verdict. The settled key is A because only that mode removes delay without skipping malware checks.
Key concepts in this question
Safe Attachments: Defender for Office 365 detonation that opens files in a sandbox.
Dynamic Delivery: delivers body immediately, swaps attachments for placeholders during scan.
Replace and Block: stricter actions that hold or drop mail, increasing wait or friction.
Monitor: logging without enforcement, insufficient when blocking is required.
Malware must-block: constraint that rules out modes that skip scanning.
Why A is correct
A is correct because Microsoft defines Dynamic Delivery as immediate delivery with safe preview while scanning completes. Blocked malware is still prevented once the verdict lands, satisfying the must-scan plus must-block rule. Replace holds files longer and Block plus redirect drops flow, so only Dynamic Delivery cuts perceived delay with full protection.
Why the others are wrong
B. Replace swaps files after scan but does not give the instant-body plus preview speed of Dynamic.
C. Block plus redirect stops delivery and adds triage, worsening delay versus Dynamic.
D. Monitor plus redirect logs without blocking, violating the must-block malware demand.
SC-200 exam tip
For faster safe mail with scanning plus blocking choose Dynamic Delivery with preview.
6Your company has a single office in Istanbul and a Microsoft 365 subscription.
The company plans to use conditional access policies to enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA).
You need to enforce MFA for all users who work remotely.
What should you include in the solution?
a fraud alert
a user risk policy
a named location
a sign-in user policy
Answer: C
The short version
C — Named location enables remote-only MFA enforcement. Named locations define office egress as trusted, then Conditional Access requires MFA for all users except that location or when location is untrusted. That enforces MFA for remote workers while sparing on-site sign-ins. Fraud alerts, user risk, and sign-in risk do not encode office geography.
Key concepts in this question
Named location: IP range object for the Istanbul egress reused as a trusted marker.
Targeting: Include all users and exclude trusted, or require MFA when untrusted.
Effect: Remote outside the range hits the grant control, office satisfies location and skips prompt.
Risk contrast: Risk policies react to scores, not static office versus remote split.
Why C is correct
Including Istanbul as named gives the engine a way to separate remote from on-site authentication. Requiring MFA from untrusted locations captures remote work without prompting office desktops. No other object creates that geographic primitive, making the settled inclusion the enabling condition.
Why the others are wrong
A. fraud alert is an MFA denial signal, not a location definition for scoping.
B. user risk triggers on compromise, missing low-risk remote sign-ins needing MFA.
D. sign-in risk keys on real-time risk, not static remote distinction.
SC-200 exam tip
Remote-only MFA equals named location plus exclude-or-require logic.
7You receive a security bulletin about a potential attack that uses an image file.
You need to create an indicator of compromise (IoC) in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint to prevent the attack.
Which indicator type should you use?
a URL/domain indicator that has Action set to Alert only
a URL/domain indicator that has Action set to Alert and block
a file hash indicator that has Action set to Alert and block
a certificate indicator that has Action set to Alert and block
Answer: C
The short version
C — File-hash indicator with Alert and block stops the image attack. Defender for Endpoint IoCs match file identity regardless of name. The settled key is C because hash plus block is the file-prevention pattern.
Key concepts in this question
Indicators of compromise: admin-defined entities that trigger alert or block across devices.
File hash: SHA-based identity for malicious images that survives renames.
Alert and block: action that both raises incident and prevents execution.
URL and domain: network IoCs for links and sites, not for local image files.
Certificate: signer trust control, too broad for one malicious image.
Why C is correct
C is correct because bulletin describes an image file payload best stopped by its hash. Creating a file-hash indicator under Settings plus Endpoints plus Indicators with Alert and block prevents the file from running while creating detections. URL or certificate types target different vectors and Alert only would permit execution, so only C prevents the attack.
Why the others are wrong
A. URL Alert only watches web locations and permits file execution, missing prevention.
B. URL Alert and block covers domains, not the local image hash vector.
D. Certificate block would hit every file from that signer, overbroad for one image IoC.
SC-200 exam tip
For malicious files use file-hash IoC with Alert and block; URLs are for links, certs for signers.
8Your company deploys the following services:
✑ Microsoft Defender for Identity
✑ Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
✑ Microsoft Defender for Office 365
You need to provide a security analyst with the ability to use the Microsoft 365 security center. The analyst must be able to approve and reject pending actions generated by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. The solution must use the principle of least privilege.
Which two roles should assign to the analyst? Each correct answer presents part of the solution.
NOTE: Each correct selection is worth one point.
the Compliance Data Administrator in Azure Active Directory (Azure AD)
the Active remediation actions role in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
the Security Administrator role in Azure Active Directory (Azure AD)
the Security Reader role in Azure Active Directory (Azure AD)
Answer: B, D
The short version
BD — Security Reader plus Active remediation actions gives least-privilege approval power. Analysts need portal access plus Endpoint approval rights. The settled key is BD because that pair covers both needs without excess admin.
Key concepts in this question
Microsoft 365 security center: portal for Defender alerts and response actions.
Security Reader: Azure AD role that grants read and portal access without broad admin rights.
Active remediation actions: Defender for Endpoint role that approves or rejects pending actions.
Least privilege: choosing smallest roles that still allow the task.
Compliance and Security Admin: broader roles that exceed the needed scope here.
Why BD is correct
BD is correct because Security Reader lets the analyst open the security center and view Endpoint actions, while Active remediation actions authorizes approve and reject on those pending items. Compliance Data Admin leans to compliance data and Security Admin grants full security control, both violating least privilege. Only B plus D matches portal plus approval with minimal excess.
Why the others are wrong
A. Compliance Data Administrator centers on compliance data, not Endpoint remediation approval.
C. Security Administrator grants far more than read plus approve, breaking least privilege.
SC-200 exam tip
For approve Endpoint actions with least privilege pair Security Reader with Active remediation actions.
9You are configuring Microsoft Cloud App Security.
You have a custom threat detection policy based on the IP address ranges of your company's United States-based offices.
You receive many alerts related to impossible travel and sign-ins from risky IP addresses.
You determine that 99% of the alerts are legitimate sign-ins from your corporate offices.
You need to prevent alerts for legitimate sign-ins from known locations.
Which two actions should you perform? Each correct answer presents part of the solution.
NOTE: Each correct selection is worth one point.
Configure automatic data enrichment.
Add the IP addresses to the corporate address range category.
Increase the sensitivity level of the impossible travel anomaly detection policy.
Add the IP addresses to the other address range category and add a tag.
Create an activity policy that has an exclusion for the IP addresses.
Answer: A, B
The short version
AB — Enrichment plus corporate range stops legitimate-location alerts. Noise arises because NAT addresses lack context and are not marked enterprise. Enrichment adds identity context to alerts, while corporate range teaches the detector those United States office IPs are expected. Together they keep legitimate sign-ins from scoring as impossible travel or risky IPs. Raising sensitivity worsens volume.
Key concepts in this question
Enrichment: Pulls identity and location metadata into alerts for context and triage.
Corporate range: Allowlist telling models which IPs are enterprise egress to exclude from travel logic.
Noise cause: Shared NAT plus mobility can mimic distant hops unless declared corporate.
Sensitivity: Increasing it generates more alerts, opposite of the reduction goal.
Why AB is correct
Most alerts are legitimate office sign-ins, so the fix must reclassify that traffic. Corporate categorization removes those IPs from travel computation, and enrichment keeps future alerts contextualized. The pair addresses model input and quality together, while other actions amplify volume or use categories travel ignores.
Why the others are wrong
C. raising sensitivity increases false positives, contradicting prevention of legitimate alerts.
D. other category is for custom cases, not the built-in corporate expectation travel respects.
E. activity exclusion is a separate custom rule path, not anomaly allowlisting.
SC-200 exam tip
Legitimate travel noise equals enrich plus mark corporate.
10You need to configure Microsoft Cloud App Security to generate alerts and trigger remediation actions in response to external sharing of confidential files.
Which two actions should you perform in the Cloud App Security portal? Each correct answer presents part of the solution.
NOTE: Each correct selection is worth one point.
From Settings, select Information Protection, select Azure Information Protection, and then select Only scan files for Azure Information Protection classification labels and content inspection warnings from this tenant.
Select Investigate files, and then filter App to Office 365.
Select Investigate files, and then select New policy from search.
From Settings, select Information Protection, select Azure Information Protection, and then select Automatically scan new files for Azure Information Protection classification labels and content inspection warnings.
From Settings, select Information Protection, select Files, and then enable file monitoring.
Select Investigate files, and then filter File Type to Document.
Answer: D, E
The short version
DE — Enable file monitoring plus auto-scan for AIP to alert on external sharing. Cloud App Security needs labeled-file visibility before policies fire. The settled key is DE because those settings supply the signal.
Key concepts in this question
Cloud App Security: broker that watches file sharing and triggers alerts plus remediation.
File monitoring: Files plus enable setting that lets the portal track sharing activity.
AIP auto-scan: automatic labeling scan for Azure Information Protection files, including new content.
Investigate filters: hunting views for apps or types, not the prerequisite scanning setup.
Only-scan option: limited scope that omits new files, insufficient for ongoing sharing control.
Why DE is correct
DE is correct because training and docs show D enables automatic scanning of new files for AIP labels while E turns on file monitoring under Information Protection plus Files. Together they feed confidential-sharing policies with labeled events. Investigate-page filters and only-scan variants do not establish that continuous labeled pipeline, so D plus E is required.
Why the others are wrong
A. Only-scan for AIP skips new files and starves the policy of fresh sharing signals.
B. Filtering app to Office 365 hunts existing data but does not enable monitoring or scanning.
C. New policy from search assumes signals exist; without D plus E there is nothing to alert on.
F. Filtering file type to document narrows hunting without turning on the required scans.
SC-200 exam tip
For external-sharing alerts first enable file monitoring plus AIP auto-scan, then build the policy.